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Abstract
According to a recent literature, the positive e¤ect of competition
is supposed to be growing with the proximity to the technological fron-
tier. Using a variety of indicators, the paper tests the e¤ect of com-
petition and regulation on innovative activity measured by patenting.
The sample consists of a panel of 15 industries for 17 OECD countries
over the period 1979-2003. Results show no evidence of a positive
e¤ect of competition growing with the proximity to the frontier. Two
main congurations emerge. First, regulation has a positive e¤ect
whatever the distance to the frontier and the magnitude of its impact
is higher the closer the industry is to the frontier. Second, the e¤ect
of regulation is negative far from the frontier and becomes positive (or
non signicant) when the technology gap decreases. These results con-
tradict the belief in the innovation-boosting e¤ect of product market
deregulation such as taken into account in the Lisbon Strategy.
Keywords: Innovation, competition, distance to frontier
JEL codes: O30, L16,
1 Introduction
Concerns about the lack of convergence of Europes productivity level vis-à-
vis the US over the past decade have been expressed not only in academic
circles but also among policy makers and politicians. As numerous reports
have shown (Kok, 2004; Sapir, 2004), Europe seems to be losing ground,
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not because of an insu¢ cient rate of capital accumulation, but for lack of
innovation capability. The so-called Lisbon Strategy, which aims at foster-
ing innovation and productivity, proposes a series of structural reforms for
labour, nancial and product markets. Regarding the latter, a link between
competition and innovation underlies the whole Lisbon Strategy: more prod-
uct market competition should bolster innovation and thus productivity and
growth.1
According to economic theory, the relation between competition and in-
novation is ambiguous. For Schumpeter (1934), monopoly prots are rewards
to innovators; the appropriability of innovation output is thus a crucial incen-
tive issue. A rise in competition is expected to decrease rents stemming from
innovation and thus incentives to innovate. This traditional "Schumpeterian
e¤ect" of competition is featured in numerous innovation-based endogenous
growth models, in particular Aghion and Howitt (1992) where innovation
e¤ort increases with the Lerner index.
On the other hand, competition may encourage innovation. Incumbents
may innovate to keep their market power and fend o¤ new entrants, or po-
tential entrants may hope to capture the market position of incumbents by
surpassing them with new and better products. In both cases, innovation
would be the means for a rm to get the upper hand over its competitors.
Extensions of the Schumpeterian innovation-based endogenous growth model
allow to take into account di¤erentiated inuences of competition on innova-
tion. The situation analysed in Aghion et al. (2005) is that of a competition
between rivals with di¤erent productivity levels. Firms innovate to decrease
their production costs "step by step": a technological laggard has to catch-
up with the technological level of the leader before having the possibility
of becoming itself a leader in the industry. The risks for the leader to lose
its position are therefore increased when the competitor is only one step
away from catching-up. When competitors have comparable productivity
levels, i.e. the so-called "neck and neck" competition, a stronger competition
will induce rms to increase their innovative investments in order to acquire
a competitive lead over rival rms. This pro-innovation e¤ect of competi-
tion is less prominent in industries where the leader has a marked advan-
tage over its competitor. The incorporation of both innovation-inducing and
innovation-deterring e¤ects of competition into a single model leads to a non-
linear, inverted U-shaped, relation between product market competition and
innovation (Aghion et al., 2005).
The link between competition and innovation has been investigated pri-
marily at the rm level. The possible existence of an e¤ect of the rms size
1e.g. the Integrated Guidelines 12 to 16 (European Commission, 2005).
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or market power on its innovative activity is a well-known topic in the inno-
vation literature (Baldwin and Scott, 1987; Cohen and Levin, 1989; Geroski,
1995). Although both pro- and anti-innovation e¤ects of competition may be
found in the empirical literature, the recent contributions tend to establish
contrasted results di¤erencing rm size e¤ects from more general competi-
tion inuences. Using a sample of French rms, Crépon, Duguet and Kabla
(1995) found that market power stimulates innovation, although this e¤ect
seems to be small in magnitude. Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998), in a
four equation model for French manufacturing rms taking into account the
rms decision to engage in R&D activities, the R&D intensity, the e¤ects
of R&D on patenting and the e¤ects of patenting on productivity, conrmed
the existence of a size e¤ect in the decision to engage in R&D activity but
not the R&D intensity. On the other hand, market share and diversication
a¤ect positively both the decision to undertake R&D and R&D intensity.
Competition may also exert negative e¤ects such as those found in Crépon
and Duguet (1997): competitorsR&D may have a negative impact on a
rms own innovation e¤ort, indicating the existence of a rivalry externality
that acts as a disincentive to innovate.
On the other hand, Nickell (1996) showed with a panel of 670 UK rms
that competition, measured by a high number of competitors or low levels
of rents, is associated to high rates of TFP growth. Whether this reveals a
direct e¤ect of competition on productivity, through a slack-reducing e¤ect
for instance, or an indirect e¤ect through innovation is undecided. Blun-
dell, Gri¢ th and vanReenen (1999) used a panel of 340 British manufac-
turing rms between 1972 and 1982 and showed that the relation between
competition and innovation possesses contrasted features. Industries where
concentration is higher and import penetration lower have fewer innovations.
This nding tends to support the existence of a positive relationship between
competition and innovation. However, within industries, rms with a higher
market share tend to commercialise more innovations. They also showed that
larger rms produce innovations of a greater commercial value than smaller
rms.
The duality of competitions e¤ects on innovation is summarised in the
ndings of Aghion (2003) and Aghion et al. (2005). With the help of rm-
level data and US Patent O¢ ce data quoted on the London Stock Exchange
between 1968 and 1997, they presented evidence of an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the Lerner index and the number of patents granted.
The "Schumpeterian e¤ect" of competition should dominate when the level
of competition is high whereas the "escape competition" e¤ect should be
prominent at low levels of product market competition. Moreover, following
the prediction of the theoretical model, the inverted U-shaped relationship
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was found to be steeper for rms that are closer to the leading edge in their
industry.
Empirical evidence at the industry level is far less abundant than at the
rm level. Industry-level studies have the advantage of allowing to escape
from the limits of the proxies for competition usually taken into account by
micro-level studies such as rm size, market power or protability level, and
consider actual industry-specic or macroeconomy-wide competition policy
measures. Gri¢ th, Harrison and Simpson (2006) measured innovation by
Business Entreprise R&D expenditure for 12 industries and nine countries
over the 1987-2000 period and investigated the e¤ect of the Single Market
Programme. Using a dummy variable for the post-SMP years, they found
that the SMP had a positive impact on innovative activity in a¤ected in-
dustries and countries. They interpreted their results as a support for the
competition-enhancing reforms advocated within the Lisbon Agenda. Nico-
letti and Scarpetta (2003) considered a sample of 23 industries for 18 OECD
countries over the period 1984-1998. They tested a model of TFP growth
using product market regulation indicators devised by the OECD both alone
and in interaction with a technology gap variable. They found statistically
signicant positive coe¢ cients on the interacted variables, a result they in-
terpreted as a catch-up slowing-down e¤ect of product market regulation.
Conway et al. (2006) tested a similar model of labour productivity with
interaction terms between product market regulation indicators and a tech-
nology gap measure on a slightly extended sample of OECD countries. They
found a signicantly positive coe¢ cient on the interacted variables too, which
they interpreted as a catch-up slowing-down e¤ect.
The di¤erentiated e¤ect of product market competition according to the
distance to the technological frontier is a central issue of the whole compe-
tition and innovation debate. The received argument is that the economic
costs of product market regulation increase the closer an economy is to the
technological frontier (Aghion, 2006). For Aghion et al. (2006), increased
competition, represented by a higher entry threat, spurs innovation incentives
in sectors close to the technological frontier, whereas it discourages innova-
tion in laggard sectors through a traditional Schumpeterian rent-diminishing
e¤ect. Testing a model of TFP growth and a model of innovation (patent-
ing) with foreign entry and distance to the technological frontier variables
included both alone and interacted along with other competition variables
on micro-level data for the UK, they concluded that, as an economy moves
closer to the technological frontier, the competitiveness of all industries in
a high-cost high-productivity economy depends on the ability to innovate.
This applies to all sectors of the economy, "high-tech" or not, since the R&D
intensity of all industries increases when economies move closer to the tech-
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nological frontier (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2006).
Concerning the inverted U-shape pattern, Tingvall and Poldahl (2006)
nd that, for Sweden rms, the support for this pattern depends on the in-
dicator. While the Herndal- index gives support to the inverted U-shape,
the price cost margin does not allow to t this pattern. Moreover, the use of
time-series estimators reduces considerably the signicance of results. Aske-
nazy, Cahn and Irac (2007), using a panel of French rms, nd that the
concavity of the courbe linking competition and innovation is substantially
reduced when the size of rms is small relatively to the cost of innovation.
For the authors, this type of rms represents 85% of the sample.
The aim of this paper is to assess the validity of the argument according
to which competition spurs innovation, and that this e¤ect is all the more
important that an economy is close to the technological frontier. A dynamic
model including variables for the distance to the frontier, competition, as well
an interaction term between them is estimated. The empirical strategy of
this paper di¤ers from the existing academic literature on three levels. First,
the analysis is conducted at the industry level, while most empirical evidence
focuses on micro studies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst work
testing the impact of competition on innovation at the industry level with
a cross-country panel. Second, we use not only indicators for observed mea-
sures of competition but also indicators of regulation policy (institutional
indicators, and output measure of competition). Finally, we run regressions
using di¤erent estimators (OLS, xed e¤ects and system GMM) in order to
take into account the dynamic nature of the innovative process and propose
di¤erent extensions of the baseline model. The use of di¤erent variants of the
model, di¤erent estimators and di¤erent indicators to measure the intensity
of competition helps to assess the robustness of our ndings. The evidence
does not give support to an innovation-bolstering e¤ect of product market
competition at the technological frontier. Moreover, the marginal e¤ect of
regulation, conditional on the closeness to the technological frontier, tends to
be upward sloping, meaning that regulation might indeed foster innovation
at the leading edge. The measure of observed competition (relative number
of rms) presents a positive e¤ect only for laggard industries and it vanishes
close to technological frontier. These results along with previous micro evi-
dence, suggest that deregulation policiy does not seem to be a substitute for
active science and technology policies, which do present a signicant impact
on technical change (Guellec and de la Potterie, 2003)
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strat-
egy and the problems related with the estimations. Section 3 intrioduces the
data used in the empirical analysis. The following Section presents the results
of the baseline model. Section 5 proposes extensions and robustness tests of
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this model. Section 6 discusses the theoretical argument relating innovation
with competition and sheds light on a possible explanation of our results: the
inclusion of innovative leaders into the Aghion et al.s (2005) model makes
the relationship between the innovation-fostering e¤ect of competition and
distance to frontier more complex. A brief conclusion follows.
2 Empirical strategy
2.1 Dynamic issues
Our purpose is to test the impact of competition on innovation with a time-
series-cross-section data at the industry level for OECD countries. This
structure has two particularities. First, information on innovation is ag-
gregated and belongs to individuals which represent di¤erent activities per-
formed in di¤erent countries. Second, a plausible model of the innovation
process should exploit this panel structure and allow for a dynamics in which
past innovations help to explain current ones. These particularities imply
a non-negligible unobserved heterogeneity among individuals that will be
present in both past and current innovation. More specically let pit be our
proxy of innovation activity in natural log and summarise, for the moment,
our explanatory covariates (in log) on the vector xit. Our problem can be
formulated as the estimation of the following dynamic multivariate model:
pit = pit 1 + xit + it (1)
Where it = i + it
The main issue is that the past realisation of our dependent variable
is endogenous to the xed e¤ect in the error term. In this framework, the
estimates of  provided by OLS are upward biased and those coming from the
Within-group estimator are downward biased (Bond 2002; Benavente et al.
2005). While the former neglects the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
i, which is the source of correlation between pit 1 and it, the latter includes
past values of pit since it subtracts the mean to eliminate i. Although these
estimators are biased, they are useful because they give an interval in which
a consistent estimation of  should lie.
Several strategies can be adopted to face these dynamic concerns. They go
from the estimation of the model in di¤erences, by instrumenting pit 1with
pit 2 using a two stage least squares (Andersen and Hsiao, 1981), to di¤erent
techniques based on the generalised method of moments (GMM). GMM-
based methods improve e¢ ciency by exploiting the moment conditions that
relate deeper lags of the dependent variable, some times transformed, to the
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error term. Among GMM techniques we are particularly interested in the one
suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully developed by Blundell and
Bond (1998), usually called system GMM (S-GMM). The di¤erence GMM
(D-GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which applies a transfor-
mation in di¤erences and uses the orthogonality conditions of available lags
of pit 1, is augmented by S-GMM under the assumption that rst di¤erences
of the instrumenting variables are uncorrelated to the error in levels. Thanks
to this assumption, one can include the original equation in levels and use
pit 2 and deeper as instruments for pit 1. The transformed equation and
the one in levels make a system in which more instruments can be exploited.
The use of a new set of instruments in di¤erences improves e¢ ciency as it
deals with the problem of weak instruments of D-GMM in persistent series.
Note that equation (1) is equivalent to state pit = (  1) pit 1+xit+ it.
Hence pit is weakly correlated with pit 1 if  is close to 1. Intuitively, in the
case of a process close to a random walk, past values will not predict current
changes as good as past changes can predict current values. In that sense,
one can expect that instrumenting pit 1 with pit s (s = 2::T ) should give
more accurate estimates. On the other hand, the inclusion of the equation in
levels will be useful to keep the information of variables that do not change
too much during time. This is namely the case of our proxies of regulation.
It should be stressed that our measure of innovation is based on the ag-
gregation of patents at the country level and distributed at the industry level
according to a transformation matrix linking technology and industry clas-
sication. In addition, to take into account xed e¤ects related to size and
economic activity we normalize this measure dividing by the hours worked.
In this context, it seems reasonably to treat this aggregated normalised mea-
sure of innovation as a continuous variable rather than counts coming from
independent experiments.
2.2 Specifying regressors xit
One advantage of GMM techniques is that they allow the other regressors
xit to be predetermined (explained by their past realisations) or endogenous
(explained by current and past realisations of other variables and by their own
autoregressive process). In our basic estimation, we consider as explanatory
variables xit the closeness to the frontier clit, the product market competition
proxy mcit and their interaction mcit  clit. As elemental controls we also
include in all regressions the capital intensity klit and the externalities exit
arising from the innovative activity of the same industry in the rest of the
world. The interaction term will capture the extent to which product market
competition inuences the innovative process conditional to the proximity to
7
the technological frontier. We also include year dummies dt in order to control
for macroeconomic shocks homogeneous across individuals. The following
baseline model is estimated:
pit =  pit 1+1 clit+2 mcitclit+3 mcit+4 klit+5 exit+6 dt+it (2)
Even though the S-GMM estimator deal with the potential endogeneity
of the regressors, as a robustness check, to reduce the risk of reverse causality,
we also estimate the model considering the explicative variables lagged once:
pit =  pit 1+1 clit 1+2 mcit 1clit 1+3 mcit 1+4 klit 1+5 exit 1+6 dt+it
(3)
Aiming at getting further insights about the concavity of the e¤ect of
competition, we augment the reduced form of the interaction and include
the squares terms of the closeness to the frontier and product market com-
petition:
pit = pit 1+1clit+2mcitclit+3mcit+4klit+5exit+7cl2it+8mc2it+6dt+it
(4)
This specication is equivalent to consider a translog approximation of a
constant elasticity function between both variables that can be more precise
to capture an eventual complementarity between them. A similar equation
is also estimated for the model with all regressor in lag 1. Finally, we test
an extended version of (2) and (4), including further controls such as import
penetration, nancial deepness and labour market regulation.
In all S-GMM regressions the set of instruments is composed of the de-
pendent variable pit, the closeness to the frontier clit, the product market
competition mcit; and their interaction mcit  clit, all in lag two or deeper.
We also use as instrument the externalities exit in lag 1 (or deeper) as we can
exploit its expected exogeneity. Since the Sargan-Hansen test for overiden-
tifying restriction, which tests the exogeneity of instruments, becomes less
rigorous as the number of instruments increases, the recommendation is to
have less instruments than individuals (Roodman, 2006), a rule that is in
line with evidence provided by simulation (see Windmeijer 2005). Since the
number of instrument is quadratic in time dimension and S-GMM generates
not only a set of instrument for the transformed equation but also for the
equation in levels, this rule, for our sample size, is some what constrain-
ing. We overcome this di¢ culty by using limited lags, by considering most
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informative instruments and by collapsing in some cases the matrix of an in-
strumenting variable into a vector. The latter strategy is equivalent to sum
up independent moment conditions in one equation. Examples of this strat-
egy are Calderon et al. (2002) or Beck and Levine (2004). In each case, the
main criterion to accept the instrumentation strategy is the Sargan-Hansen
test and its version in di¤erence which allows to test a subset of instruments.
In addition, we pay special attention to the autocorrelation of the error term,
a crucial assumption for the validity of instruments in lag 2. To do so, use
is made of the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in di¤erences. Since
by construction rst order correlation is expected we only focus on the test
for second order correlation in di¤erence, which relates it 1 with it 2 by
looking at the correlation between it and it 2.
2.3 The marginal e¤ect of competition on innovation
Since we have included an interaction term between product market compe-
tition and the closeness to technological frontier (mcit  clit), the assessment
concerning the expected overall e¤ect of product market competition mcit
needs the computation of its marginal e¤ect conditional on specic values of
the closeness to technological frontier clit (Braumoeller 2004):
@E(pit=xit)
@mcit
= b2clit + b3 (5)
For the translog version:
@E(pit=xit)
@mcit
= b2clit + b3 + 2b8mcit (6)
Similar expressions hold for (3) and the lagged version of (4). It is easy to
see, for instance, that a positive and signicant b2 means nothing but that
competition increases innovation activity only for an individual completely
far away the technological frontier (clit = 0). That is for the unrealistic
case of zero labour productivity. Notice that for the augmented version (4),
the calculation of the marginal e¤ect of competition depends on the level of
competition itself mcit in (6):
As each of these linear combinations is computed using the estimated
values of 2,3 and 8; one still needs to determine their signicance, which
in turn will depend on the variance of estimates and the value at which clit
is evaluated (Friedrich 1982). For the (5), this signicance is given by the
ratio
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b2clit + b3qbb3b3 + cl2itbb2b2 + 2cl2itbb2b3
Where b is the sample covariance between  and . Hence, statistically
insignicant coe¢ cients may combine to produce statistically signicant con-
ditional e¤ects. In our regression we evaluate the marginal e¤ect and its
signicance for the minimum, one deviation under the mean, the mean, one
deviation over the mean and the maximum sample values of clit. For the
translog version we take the mean value of mcit:
2.4 Testing for unit root
The validity of lagged di¤erences as instruments for levels depends on whether
this lagged di¤erences are uncorrelated with the error term. Blundell and
Bond (1998) state this assumption in terms of the stationarity of the initial
conditions of the autoregressive process. Let us consider the reduced AR(1)
version of our model:
pit = pit 1 + it it = i + it (7)
If the initial conditions do not deviate systematically from their long
term stationary value E
 
yi1  
  i
1 

i

= 0; it follows that the deviation
itself will be uncorrelated with the xed e¤ect. Thus, for the second period
onwards the di¤erence of the dependent variable will be also uncorrelated
with the xed e¤ect. In other words, under this assumption, a rst di¤erence
transformation of the instrument will be enough to purge i. If there is no
serial correlation of it, then E [pit 1it] = 0.
As a consequence, we verify the risk of unit root of our main time series
variables by the means of the Fisher test developed by Maddala and Wu
(1999) for panel data. Alternative tests such as Levin, Lin and Chu (2002)
and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) seem less convenient for our case. First,
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) consider the strong assumption that all units
have the same autoregressive coe¢ cient. This assumption constraints the
alternative hypothesis to posit that all series are stationary. Second, the
single statistic of the Fisher test, resuming the signicance of all individual
unit root test, has an exact 2 distribution. On the contrary, Im, Pesaran and
Shin (2003) consider the mean of the t-statistic of each Augmented Dickey-
Fuller individual test, whose normality is asymptotic. Finally, as both tests
assume that the sample period is the same for all cross-section units, they
need a balanced panel data. This reduces the size of the sample and the
e¢ ciency of the test.
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Results of these tests are reported in Table 13 (appendix). In order
to allows for serial correlation in the error term we consider one and two
lags of yit for each individual Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. We do not
take a risk rejecting the null hypothesis of non stationary for all series when
the autoregressive model considers a constant (drift). This specication is
consistent with our regressions.
3 Data
We collected information for 17 OECD countries and 15 manufacturing in-
dustries at two-digit ISIC-Rev3 from 1979 to 2003 (Table 8). Original data
come from OECD-STAN, GGDC-ICOP project2 and EUROSTAT databases.
From OECD-STAN we use trade indicators and investment series. Starting
from OECD-STAN, the GGDC-ICOP data complete the information with
surveys and their own estimations, consistent with national accountings.3
This data is our original source for value added series, implicit deators and
hours worked. Patent series were obtained from EUROSTAT, which dis-
tribute by industries the number of patents granted according to a matrix
relating technology and industry classication.
3.1 Distance to frontier
Labour productivity (value added per hour worked) is used as the main mea-
sure of e¢ ciency. The technological frontier is dened as the most productive
available technology for each ISIC-Rev3 Industry at every period. The indi-
vidual (country-industry couple) having the maximum labour productivity
among all countries in a given year is identied as the technological leader
for that year. The closeness to the frontier is measured as the ratio of labour
productivity relative to that of the frontier.4 For instance, the closeness to
the frontier of Spain in chemical industry in 1994 is the labour productivity
2The International Comparisons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project of the
Groningen Growth & Development Centre (GGDC)
3GGDC-ICOP estimate OECD-STAN missing information going to alternative sources
and applying di¤erent estimation methods. However, the resulting dispersion is consider-
ably bigger (See GGDC rows in Table 3.9 in appendix). We drop GGDC-ICOP estimations
of industry 30 (o¢ ce machinery) because of its high dispersion and keep the OECD-STAN
values for GGDC-ICOP outliers when OECD information exists. The global dispersion
considerably diminishes (Filtered Data). With this lter we get 6098 observation instead
of 4129, with series quite comparable to those available in OECD-STAN.
4The distance to frontier is the inverted ratio.
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of the Spanish chemical industry in 1994 divided by the highest labour pro-
ductivity level for chemicals among all countries in that year. We consider a
moving average of three year in order to smooth the series.
All nominal series were deated to 1997 in their national currency. How-
ever, in order to make an international comparison at the industry level, we
need to take into account price di¤erences among countries at the industry
level (cross section deation). This is particularly important for value added
series since we base our productive measure on them. Use is made of the in-
dustry purchasing power parities (I-PPPs) provided by Timmer, Ympa and
van Ark (2006) for 1997. The authors consider a mix between purchasing
power parities based on two points of the productive process: consumer ex-
penditure and production. Expenditure PPPs are computed from ICP index
and production PPPs from average producer prices, which are calculated at
the industry level dividing output values by quantities. While the former in-
cludes only nal goods and must be adjusted for taxes, distribution margins
and trade costs, the latter needs to face the problem of matching varieties
of goods that may di¤er in quality and product denition among countries.
The selected PPPs measure (adjusted-expenditure or production) depends on
the specicity of each industry. The authors propose a harmonised dataset
of purchasing power parities disaggregated at the industry level (I-PPPs) for
a wide sample of developing countries. Aiming at getting comparable series,
they apply the multilateral weighted aggregation method proposed by Elteto
and Koves (1964) and Szulc (1964) (EKS). This method allows to obtain
transitivity in multilateral comparisons starting from binary comparisons.
Table 10 (appendix) shows the average labour productivity of each coun-
try for the full sample period and compares the values whether one uses
the standard (non-adjusted) expenditure PPPs at the country level or the
industry-PPP computed by Timmer, Ympa and van Ark (2006). Table 11
(appendix) presents similar gures at the industry level (world sample av-
erage). At the country level the average of labour productivity for the full
sample period seems similar among countries. However, the variation in-
duced by both measures increases if one considers the industry level. This
issue is important because the hierarchy in terms of productivity and namely
the identication of the frontier level might change.
3.2 Innovation
As a proxy of innovation we consider the number of patents. At the industry
level, they are provided by EUROSTAT. In this database the applications at
the European Patents O¢ ce (EPO) are linked to industry standard classi-
cations by the means of a detailed matrix of weights. This matrix builds on
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rm data allowing to relate ISIC industries to the subclasses of International
Patent Classication (IPC) categories. The US counterpart of the EPO is
the United States Patents and Trademarked O¢ ce (USPTO). Both series
are not directly comparable since the EPO system informs about applica-
tions and the USPTO about patent granted. We consider the EPO system
as it is more representative for the countries present in our sample. Aiming
at controlling for market size e¤ects, patents are normalised by the hours
worked of the industry. At the end we get a continuous aggregated measure
of innovation that enables international comparisons at the industry level.
Information on R&D expenditure, disaggregated at the industry level, is
available from the OECD ANDBERD database. Nevertheless, the intersec-
tion between R&D information and the availability of the rest of variables
leads to a signicant reduction of the number of observations (mainly Aus-
tria, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and R&D data is only available from
1987.
3.3 Competition and regulation measures
Five indicators have been selected to capture product market competition.
On order to capture the extent of competition, we use both input (de jure)
and output (de facto) measures of the competitive environment. Within the
rst group of proxies, we consider four indicators of market regulation: (1)
the global product market regulation PMR provided by the OECD and doc-
umented by Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005); (2) the size of the public
enterprise sector PMR(public), a component of PMR that focuses on state
control; (3) the regulatory provisions in non-manufacturing sectors (tele-
coms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and road freight)
summarised by the REGREF indicator, also provided by the OECD (Conway
and Nicoletti, 2006) and (4) the corresponding e¤ect of these regulatory pro-
visions on the manufacturing sector given by the REGIMP indicator, which
is also documented by (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). REGIMP is based on
an input/output matrix dening the use of non-manufacturing sectors as in-
puts in manufacturing. Thus, it aims at capturing the "knock-on" e¤et of
regulation in selected non-manufacturing sectors on manufacturing.
On the other hand, we also consider a measure of the outcome of compe-
tition, namelly the number of rms per value added (N-FIRMS/VA), which
is a proxy of market atomicity (or the inverse of the average size), usually
expected to be the result of the reduction of market barriers.
The scope of these indicators is as follow. REGIMP and N-FIRMS/VA
are consistent with our time-series-cross-section data structure. REGREF is
a time series at the country level reecting the evolution of the economy-wide
13
competitive environment. Finally, PMR and PMR(public) are computed at
the country level for two point times (1998 and 2003). They have been
distributed for two periods: before and after 2000. Since PMR is based on a
collection of private and governmental practices, this distribution should be in
line with the evolution of European market reforms. Figure 1 gives a picture
of the hierarchy of countries depending on their regulatory environments.
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US
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Figure 1. Hierarchy of regulatory environments
3.4 Controls
We use two elemental controls: capital intensity and innovation spillovers.
Capital series were constructed using investment series and the standard
Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). This method uses the dynamic rule by
which current capital stock equals the stock of the preceding period after
depreciation plus current investment. To compute the initial stock, the PIM
method supposes that pre-sample investment grows at a constant rate. Under
the assumption of steady state this rate equals the one of value added. After
applying this result to the dynamic rule, the initial stock becomes a function
of initial investment, the global depreciation rate and the steady state growth
rate of value added. We proxy the latter with the mean of the sample period
and use a depreciation rate of 7.5%, the standard assumption. To capture
14
innovation spillovers, we consider patenting activity of the rest of the world
in the same manufacturing industry (the number of patents per hour worked
produced by the same industry in the rest of the world).
As additional controls, we also include indicators of foreign competition,
labour market regulation and nancial deepness: the import penetration
ratio MPEN available in OECD-STAN at the industry level, the employ-
ment protection indicator EPLBLD proposed by Amable, Demmou and Gatti
(2007) at the country level, which updates the EPL indicator of the OECD,
and the nancialisation ratio dened as the total assets of institutional in-
vestors relative to GDP. Table 12 (appendix) summarises the main descrip-
tive statistics.
4 Results
4.1 OLS and Within-group regressions
Table 1 presents OLS and Within-group estimates of the e¤ects of competi-
tion on patenting using de facto and de jure measures of competition: the
number of rms relative to value added (N-FIRMS/VA in columns [1] to [3])
the "knock-on" e¤ect of regulation in non-manufacturing sectors (REGIMP
in columns [4] to [6]), the indicator of competition in non-manufacturing sec-
tors (REGREF in columns [7] to [9]), the economy-wide indicator of product
market regulation (PMR in [10] to [12]) and the indicator for public sector
(PMR(Public) in [13] to [16]). The models di¤er with the inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable and the estimator: OLS or Within-group panel
estimator. Models [3], [6], [9], [12] and [15] are rst di¤erence equations with
no lagged dependent variable. This amounts to forcing the coe¢ cient of the
lagged dependent variable in level to be equal to one.
As expected, the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable di¤ers
greatly between the OLS and xed-e¤ect estimator, being greater for the
former model. Also the signs of the coe¢ cients for the externality e¤ect and
the capital/labour ratio are mostly signicantly positive. For each regres-
sion, the lower panel of the Table presents the estimated marginal e¤ects
of the competition indicator for di¤erent levels of the relative productivity
level (the closeness to the frontier). The rst line of the lower panel gives
the value of the marginal e¤ect when the relative technological level is at
its minimum (min), i.e. when the distance to frontier is at its maximum.
The last lines give the marginal e¤ects and standard errors when the relative
productivity level is at the maximum of the sample, i.e. at the technology
frontier. Marginal e¤ects coe¢ cients are also presented for the mean value of
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the relative technological level, the mean value minus one standard deviation
and plus one standard deviation. Therefore, reading a column of the lower
panel of the Table shows how the marginal e¤ect of competition changes as
the distance to the technological frontier decreases and vanishes.
The interpretation of the marginal e¤ect for regressions [1] to [3], with
the relative number of rms indicator, di¤ers from the interpretation for the
other indicators. A higher relative number of rms is a direct measure com-
petition since it informs about the number of competitors that share the same
market. It can also be interpreted as an inverse measure of the average rms
size in the industry, related to the level of concentration in the industry. If
competition is more favourable to innovation near the technological frontier,
the marginal e¤ects should increase as the relative technological level aug-
ments from its minimum to its maximum. Indeed, if one follows strictly the
predictions of Aghion et al. (2005), Aghion (2006), one should expect a neg-
ative marginal e¤ect of competition far from the technological frontier (the
Schumpeterian e¤ect) and a positive e¤ect close to the frontier (the escape
competitione¤ect). Results reported in Table 1 show that, while the relative
number of rms is positively correlated with innovation in laggard industries,
its e¤ect decreases as the industry moves closer to the technological frontier.
At the leading edge the e¤ect of competition given by this indicator loses
its signicancy. Having a less concentrated industry seems to matter more
when the industry is far from the leading edge than when it is near. This
result is true whatever the estimator or specication, only the magnitude of
the e¤ects and their signicance change. This result could be compared with
the positive size e¤ect found in many micro studies of innovation. If the rm
size is a positive inuence on innovation, one may suppose that it will be all
the more important that the technological competition is erce, i.e. that the
industry is close to the leading edge.
Using a proxy for size or concentration in the industry is subject to the
usual limitations: it measures the outcome of the competition process, not
so much the competitive environment. In this respect, the use of indicators
of regulation will make it possible to avoid ambiguous interpretations of the
results. The interpretation of the marginal e¤ects of regulation according
to the proximity to thefrontier is straightforward. Again, if competition is
good for innovation, product market regulation should exert a negative in-
uence on patenting, all the more so that the distance to frontier diminishes.
Indeed, for Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005) and Conwayand Nicoletti
(2006), these regulation proxies reect ant-competitive market barriers. Fol-
lowing Aghion et al.s (2005) predictions, regulation could be good when the
industry is far from the frontier, but should gradually become detrimental as
the distance to frontier is reduced. One observes contrasted results in regres-
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sions using the REGIMP indicator (columns [4] to [6] in Table 1), which is
provided in panel-data-like structure (times-series-cross-section data). The
OLS regression gives marginal e¤ects non signicantly di¤erent from zero, i.e.
no impact of product market regulation on innovation whatever the distance
to frontier. The xed e¤ect regression gives a statistically negative impact
of regulation, which is increasing with the relative technological level. On
the other hand, considering the model without the lagged dependent variable
gives signicant positive marginal e¤ects of regulation.
Looking at the results documented in Table 1 (columns [4] to [15]), three
congurations emerge. The most frequent case is that of a positive impact of
regulation policy, which is decreasing as the industry approaches the tech-
nological frontier but remains signicantly positive even at the frontier([6],
[10],[12],[13] and [15]). In regression [7], this positive marginal e¤ect appears
on the contrary to increase as the industry moves closer to the frontier. On
the other hand, regulation policy turns out to have a negative signicant
marginal e¤ect in regressions [5] and [8]. Although this e¤ect is decreasing
with the closeness to the frontier, it appears signicantly negative for lag-
gard industries. Furthermore, in some cases regulation turns out to have
non signicant marginal e¤ects, no matter what the distance to the frontier
is ([4],[9],[11] and [14]). Interestingly, even if these regressions do not allow
to conclude to a single pattern of the relationship between competition and
innovation, none of them reproduce the predictions of the baseline model.
4.2 Addressing dynamics (System-GMM regressions)
As argued in the previous Section, OLS and Within-group estimators may
not be appropriate for the problem considered here. The use of the S-GMM
estimator will allow us to deal with the lagged dependent variable bias and
the potential endogeneity of several of the regressors. One may indeed sup-
pose that the competition indicators taken into account here are endogenous.
For instance, lagging rms or industries may pressure for protection from
competition in exchange for political support, whereas the support for regu-
lation would be less pronounced in the vicinity of the technological frontier.
Other variables may also be endogenous to the growth process itself. For
these reasons, the competition indicators and the capital/labour ratio will
be considered as endogenous in the S-GMM estimations.
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N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Patenting (t-1) 0.896*** 0.903*** 0.843*** 0.922*** 0.887***
(0.064) (0.032) (0.049) (0.022) (0.033)
Closeness to Frontier -0.013 1.924** -0.284 0.003 0.046
(0.126) (0.972) (0.230) (0.053) (0.129)
Closeness × Competition (Regulation) -0.113* 0.936** 0.494** 0.020 0.068
(0.067) (0.469) (0.198) (0.114) (0.096)
Competition (Regulation) 0.509* -3.794** -1.926** 0.257 -0.144
(0.280) (1.909) (0.823) (0.450) (0.397)
Externalities 0.177* 0.116** 0.219*** 0.084*** 0.114***
(0.105) (0.046) (0.064) (0.024) (0.036)
Capital Intensity 0.032 -0.032 0.122 -0.041 0.118**
(0.057) (0.041) (0.079) (0.039) (0.055)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 1352 2646 2646 2521 2646
Sargan-Hansen p 0.387 0.164 0.117 0.187 0.224
AR(2)p 0.522 0.908 0.919 0.654 0.946
Instruments 122 136 131 106 142
Individuals 133 148 148 134 148
Estimator SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM
N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
Closeness  (sample values) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Minimum 0.294* -2.033** -0.997** 0.294 -0.017
(0.153) (1.027) (0.455) (0.264) (0.217)
Mean less one standard deviation 0.100** -0.451* -0.162 0.330* 0.098
(0.045) (0.240) (0.150) (0.175) (0.063)
Mean 0.053* -0.028 0.061 0.338* 0.128***
(0.028) (0.062) (0.105) (0.183) (0.038)
Mean plus one standard deviation 0.006 0.395** 0.284** 0.345* 0.159***
(0.035) (0.200) (0.125) (0.199) (0.052)
Maximum -0.012 0.516** 0.348** 0.348* 0.167***
(0.042) (0.258) (0.141) (0.208) (0.062)
Note: Hubert-White corrected standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  All variables in log
Regressions for Competition ([1] ) and Regulation ([2] to [5])
Dependent Variable: Patenting (patents decomposition /hours worked) - System-GMM Estimations
Marginal effect of competition ([1]) and Regulation ([2] to [5])
Table 2.
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Figure 2. Marginal e¤ect of N-Firms/VA on patenting
Table 2 presents the S-GMM estimations of the e¤ects of competition on
innovation. As in our previous results, the number of rms plays a positive
role for innovation, but only when industries are far from the technological
frontier (Column [1]). This e¤ect vanishes once the relative productivity level
rises above the mean. Figure 2 presents the plot of the marginal e¤ect against
the closeness to the technological frontier. As one notices clearly with the
condence intervals, a signicant innovation-boosting e¤ect exists only for
industries under the mean relative productivity. The Figure displays also the
histogram of the relative productivity levels. One notices that only a limited
number of industry laggards are likely to benet from increased competition
while the bulk of the industries would benet very little if anything.
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Figure 3. Marginal e¤ect of REGIMP on patenting
This e¤ect of competition is broadly conrmed by the results obtained
using the indicators of regulation. For the regulation impact (Column [2]
and Figure 3) and regulation in non-manufacturing activities (Column [3]
and Figure 4) indicators, competition regulation has a negative impact on
innovation far from the frontier. This e¤ect becomes gradually positive as
the relative productivity level increases above the mean and turns out to
be signicantly positive at the frontier. The results for the economy-wide
product market regulation indicators (Columns [4] and [5], Figures 5 and
6) are in line with those just mentioned. Product market regulation has no
impact on innovation far from the frontier, and an increasingly positive e¤ect
as the productivity level rises.
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Figure 4. Marginal e¤ect of REGREF on patenting
On the whole, the use of an estimator well-suited to a dynamic specica-
tion allows to depict a clearer picture about the marginal e¤ect of competi-
tion and regulation according to the proximity to the technological frontier:
product market regulation has an increasingly positive impact on innova-
tion as the industry moves closer to the frontier, i.e. the marginal e¤ects of
regulation indicators display a positive slope. The ndings with the relative
number of rms as a proxy for the outcome of market competition are consis-
tent with this result. The next Section checks the robustness of these results
by considering alternative specications under system GMM.
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Figure 5. Marginal e¤ect of PMR on patenting
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Figure 3.9. Marginal e¤ect of PMR(Public) on patenting
5 Robustness tests
5.1 Additional controls
The model considered in the preceding Section is now extended to include
other variables. The competition indicators considered previously referred
to the domestic situation only. However competition from foreign rms can
be important in some industries. In order to control for this e¤ect, the
import penetration ratio is included in the regressions. Other institutional
variables may have an inuence too. The literature on competition and
innovation refers particularly to labour and nancial markets (Aghion, 2006).
More labour market exibility is supposed to favour restructuring and hasten
the decline of sunset industries, allowing factors to be transferred to sunrise
industries (Saint-Paul, 2002). Also, more developed nancial markets are
expected to boost innovative investment since credit-constrained rms may
not be able to nance the xed costs necessary to develop new product or
processes. For these reasons, two variables were introduced in the regression:
a measure of employment protection and the ratio of total nancial assets of
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institutional investors to GDP (OECD). Results for the extended models are
presented in Table 3.
Import penetration turns out to have signicant coe¢ cients for mod-
els [1] and [4]. Each time, the coe¢ cient is positive, which means that the
innovation-boosting e¤ect of foreign competition is present. However, chang-
ing the competition indicator leads to non signicant coe¢ cients in models
[2], [3] and [5]. The labour market legislation (employment protection) vari-
able obtains signicant coe¢ cients with all regulation indicators. However,
the impact is negative with the economy-wide product market regulation
indicators ([4] and [5]) but positive with the non-manufacturing regulation
indicators ([2] and [3]). One cannot therefore conclude to the existence of
an innovation-hindering e¤ect of employment legislation. Finally, the nan-
cial variable obtains signicant, positive, coe¢ cients with the economy-wide
indicators ([4] and [5]).
The extension of the model with the three variables do not signicantly
change the results concerning the marginal e¤ect of product market regu-
lation or competition. The magnitude of the e¤ect is sometimes changed
(for instance with the "knock-on" e¤ect of non-manufacturing regulation
REGIMP) but the positively-sloped relationship of the regulation e¤ect with
the relative productivity level is maintained. The same applies for the neg-
ative slope of the marginal e¤ect of the relative number of rms ([1]) The
only change worth mentioning takes place with the REGREF indicator([3]),
usually used as proxy of the evolution of regulation at the national level.
Using this indicator, regulation now fails to have a positive impact on inno-
vation even at the frontier. However, since REGIMP seems more suited to
the industry-level data used in the estimations, the results of model [2] are
supposed to be more accurate. One can also note that the positive impact
of the PMR variable restricted to the Public Sector [5] turns now signicant
far from the technological frontier whereas it was not the case in the baseline
model (Table 2, column [5]).
We also consider a translog-like specication to test the e¤ect of the in-
teraction between competition and proximity to the frontier. To this e¤ect,
quadratic terms for the distance to frontier and the competition indicators
were introduced in the regressions. This more exible function should make
it possible to estimate more accurately the e¤ects of regulation. Results are
presented in Table 4. Once again, nothing substantial is altered in compar-
ison with the results in Tables 2 or 3. The slopes of the marginal e¤ects
remain the same and the magnitude of the e¤ects is not changed very much.
However, this time, regulation fails to have a positive innovation e¤ect at the
frontier even with the REGIMP indicator.
25
N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Patenting (t-1) 0.919*** 0.857*** 0.840*** 0.835*** 0.693***
(0.027) (0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.082)
Closeness to Frontier -0.125 1.411*** -0.031 -0.117 -0.027
(0.133) (0.516) (0.125) (0.106) (0.111)
Closeness × Competition (Regulation) -0.104 0.665*** 0.065 0.265 0.059
(0.069) (0.257) (0.115) (0.163) (0.086)
Competition (Regulation) 0.469 -2.814*** -0.780 -0.010 0.775
(0.289) (1.067) (0.551) (0.927) (0.485)
Externalities 0.061* 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.106* 0.282***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.043) (0.062) (0.086)
Capital Intensity 0.168** -0.069 0.033 0.015 0.119**
(0.070) (0.074) (0.054) (0.063) (0.057)
Import Penteration 0.109* -0.054 0.015 0.239** 0.052
(0.062) (0.047) (0.060) (0.118) (0.092)
Labour Market Regulation -0.045 0.118* 0.169* -0.444** -0.278*
(0.033) (0.069) (0.098) (0.207) (0.153)
Financial Assets/GDP -0.019 -0.001 -0.012 0.293** 0.518**
(0.051) (0.060) (0.055) (0.117) (0.207)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 1154 2110 2110 2110 2110
Sargan-Hansen p 0.378 0.148 0.125 0.128 0.117
AR(2)p 0.823 0.920 0.885 0.900 0.873
Instruments 99 122 93 75 106
Individuals 125 126 126 126 126
Estimator SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM
N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
Closeness  (sample values) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Minimum 0.232* -1.425*** -0.644* 0.545 0.899**
(0.134) (0.534) (0.341) (0.673) (0.394)
Mean less one standard deviation 0.086** -0.349** -0.538** 0.974* 0.994***
(0.042) (0.142) (0.222) (0.545) (0.371)
Mean 0.045* -0.104 -0.513** 1.072** 1.016***
(0.024) (0.091) (0.209) (0.531) (0.373)
Mean plus one standard deviation 0.004 0.142 -0.489** 1.171** 1.038***
(0.029) (0.119) (0.204) (0.522) (0.377)
Maximum -0.012 0.248* -0.479** 1.213** 1.047***
(0.037) (0.150) (0.205) (0.521) (0.380)
Note: Hubert-White corrected standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  All variables in log
Dependent Variable: Patenting (patents decomposition /hours worked) - System-GMM Estimations
Regressions for Competition ([1] ) and Regulation ([2] to [5]) (Full set of controls)
Marginal effect of Competition ([1] ) and Regulation ([2] to [15])
Table 3.
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N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Patenting (t-1) 0.918*** 0.836*** 0.865*** 0.913*** 0.880***
(0.031) (0.041) (0.033) (0.024) (0.031)
Closeness to Frontier 0.891* 0.385 0.674 0.115 0.301
(0.479) (0.681) (0.846) (0.580) (0.298)
Closeness × Competition (Regulation) -0.061 0.396* 0.505** 0.042 0.052
(0.038) (0.218) (0.242) (0.096) (0.089)
Competition (Regulation) 0.295** -1.248 -4.420*** 1.001* -0.132
(0.147) (1.070) (1.406) (0.514) (0.345)
Externalities 0.102** 0.191*** 0.180*** 0.095*** 0.119***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.042) (0.026) (0.035)
Capital Intensity 0.037 0.011 0.014 -0.033 0.103***
(0.046) (0.041) (0.038) (0.043) (0.036)
Closeness to Frontier² -0.139** -0.099 0.078 -0.014 -0.037
(0.064) (0.113) (0.082) (0.084) (0.041)
Competition² (Regulation²) 0.013 -0.095 -0.553*** -0.533*** 0.087
(0.010) (0.201) (0.161) (0.169) (0.111)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 1352 2646 2646 2521 2646
Sargan-Hansen p 0.556 0.185 0.211 0.288 0.117
AR(2)p 0.524 0.950 0.904 0.651 0.958
Instruments 121 142 144 106 143
Individuals 133 148 148 134 148
Estimator SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM
N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
Closeness  (sample values) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Minimum 0.178** -0.765* -1.180** 0.485* 0.152
(0.076) (0.429) (0.542) (0.286) (0.263)
Mean less one standard deviation 0.073*** -0.096 -0.327** 0.560** 0.240
(0.021) (0.132) (0.147) (0.234) (0.160)
Mean 0.048** 0.082 -0.098 0.576** 0.263*
(0.020) (0.137) (0.074) (0.238) (0.148)
Mean plus one standard deviation 0.022 0.261 0.130 0.592** 0.286**
(0.030) (0.198) (0.115) (0.247) (0.145)
Maximum 0.013 0.312 0.195 0.598** 0.293**
(0.034) (0.221) (0.141) (0.252) (0.147)
Note: Hubert-White corrected standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  All variables in log
Dependent Variable: Patenting (patents decomposition /hours worked) - System-GMM Estimations
Regressions for Competition ([1] ) and Regulation ([2] to [5]) (Translog Model)
Marginal effect of Competition ([1] ) and Regulation ([2] to [15])
Table 4.
The two above-mentioned extensions can be combined to obtain a translog
model with the full set of controls. Table 5 presents the estimations of this
model with the various competition or regulation indicators. The results
concerning the marginal e¤ects are basically unchanged. The main result, i.e.
the non existence of a signicant negative e¤ect of product market regulation
at the technological frontier, is preserved. However, it should be also noticed
that, relatively to the simple translog model, the extended one provides a
better assessment of the impact of regulation. While in the previous table
(Table 4, columns [2] and [3]) the marginal e¤ects of regulation in services
and their impact on industries were only signicant far from the frontier, they
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are now signicant for a larger interval. Concerning the e¤ects of additional
controls, results are not substantially modied. The positive e¤ects of labour
market legislation obtained with the regimpact and REGREF indicators now
turn out to be insignicant (columns [2] and [3]) while the negative impact
obtained with the economy-wide regulation indicators is maintained. The
nancial assets variable only obtains a signicant coe¢ cient with the PMR
variable restricted to the Public sector (column [5]).
Besides some changes in the signicance and magnitude of the marginal
e¤ect of regulation, the picture depicted in the system-GMM regressions
(Table 2) remains qualitatively unchanged after this rst robustness test.
Indeed, most of the time, regulation policy improves innovative performances
as one moves closer to the leading edge of technology (columns [2][4][5], Tables
2, 3 and 4). Only the model with additional institutional controls using the
regulation in services indicator (column [3], Tables 3 and 5) delivers divergent
results. Product market regulation turns out signicantly detrimental to
innovative performances near the frontier only in regression [3] in Table 3.
Nevertheless, this adverse impact of services regulation is weaker the closer
to the frontier an industry is.
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N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Patenting (t-1) 0.920*** 0.950*** 0.814*** 0.927*** 0.688***
(0.023) (0.031) (0.053) (0.040) (0.076)
Closeness to Frontier 0.344 1.632 1.495 -0.520 0.791
(0.825) (1.103) (1.148) (0.599) (0.817)
Closeness × Competition (Regulation) -0.101 0.565** 0.401 0.101 0.075
(0.066) (0.276) (0.246) (0.143) (0.076)
Competition (Regulation) 0.462* -4.143** -1.016 0.850 0.814
(0.274) (2.003) (0.860) (0.951) (0.529)
Externalities 0.066** 0.062** 0.165*** 0.025 0.292***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.052) (0.036) (0.080)
Capital Intensity 0.154** 0.006 0.087 0.032 0.127**
(0.064) (0.103) (0.058) (0.053) (0.061)
Import Penteration 0.099* -0.023 0.073 0.205** 0.032
(0.054) (0.069) (0.061) (0.104) (0.094)
Labour Market Regulation -0.031 -0.026 0.058 -0.276* -0.308*
(0.036) (0.077) (0.093) (0.161) (0.177)
Financial Assets/GDP -0.000 -0.021 -0.017 0.088 0.490**
(0.050) (0.060) (0.061) (0.092) (0.204)
Closeness to Frontier² -0.062 -0.046 -0.249 0.064 -0.113
(0.107) (0.103) (0.182) (0.093) (0.116)
Competition² (Regulation²) 0.008 -0.421 -0.391** -0.416 -0.057
(0.011) (0.300) (0.189) (0.429) (0.159)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 1154 2110 2110 2110 2110
Sargan-Hansen p 0.294 0.137 0.219 0.231 0.210
AR(2)p 0.815 0.928 0.893 0.920 0.889
Instruments 103 95 88 77 110
Individuals 125 126 126 126 126
Estimator SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM SY_GMM
N-FIRMS/VA REGIMP REGREF PMR PMR (Public)
Closeness  (sample values) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Minimum 0.233* -1.222** -1.250* 0.596 0.846**
(0.125) (0.578) (0.651) (0.501) (0.348)
Mean less one standard deviation 0.091** -0.308* -0.601** 0.759* 0.967***
(0.038) (0.187) (0.284) (0.448) (0.351)
Mean 0.052** -0.099 -0.453** 0.796* 0.995***
(0.023) (0.150) (0.216) (0.452) (0.357)
Mean plus one standard deviation 0.013 0.109 -0.305* 0.833* 1.022***
(0.031) (0.175) (0.172) (0.462) (0.366)
Maximum -0.003 0.199 -0.241 0.849* 1.034***
(0.039) (0.201) (0.164) (0.468) (0.370)
Note: Hubert-White corrected standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01;  All variables in log
Dependent Variable: Patenting (patents decomposition /hours worked) - System-GMM Estimations
Regressions for Competition ([1] ) and Regulation ([2] to [5]) (Full set of controls; Translog Model)
Marginal effect of Competition ([1] ) and Regulation ([2] to [15])
Table 5.
5.2 The model with lagged regressors
To test further the robustness of the results, regressors are now included with
a lag. This specication allow to further reduce the risk of reverse causality.
Results for the base and for the translog models are presented in Tables 6
and 7 and are compared with those of the contemporaneous model (Tables
2 and 4).
Concerning the base model for the S-GMM estimates, two main di¤er-
ences arise. First, while the contemporaneous model account for a positive
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signicant impact of regulation close to the frontier (Table 2, columns [2] and
[3]), regulation policy in the lagged model does not have a signicant impact
near the frontier (Table 6, columns [2] and [3]). In contrast, the economy-wide
regulation indicator for the Public sector turns out now to have a signicant
and positive impact for laggard industries , while they were non signicant
in the baseline model (Table 2 and 6, columns [4] and [5]). For all regula-
tion indicators the main result obtained with system-GMM estimations is
conrmed, i.e. a positively-sloped relationship for the marginal e¤ect of reg-
ulation as the distance to the frontier decreases. Also, one should note that
the negative slope for the relative number of rms is preserved.
Results for the translog model estimations are given in Table 7. Two main
remarks can be made. First, for the impact of service regulation (REGREF)
and Public sector indicators (PMR(public), the magnitude of the marginal
e¤ect is higher in the translog lagged model than in contemporaneous one (see
Tables 4 and 7). Second, the adverse impact of the REGREF and REGIMP
indicators ([2] and [3] appear signicant for a wider interval, at least up to
the mean value of the relative productivity level, whereas this e¤ect was only
signicant for small values in the translog contemporaneous model (Table 4).
Most importantly, the upward slope of the marginal e¤ect is still observed.
One should stress that here again the most interesting result is not sub-
stantially modied: there is no evidence of an adverse impact of regulation
near the frontier and the marginal e¤ects of regulation display a positively-
sloped relationship against the relative productivity level of the industry.
Similarly, the marginal e¤ect of the number of rms per value added on
patenting is signicantly positive for laggard industries and decreases with
the productivity gap, becoming non signicant at the frontier.
6 A possible explanation
Recent works have undertaken the attempt to reconcile the traditional Schum-
peterian view of a negative e¤ect of competition on innovation and the idea
according to which competition may push rms to reduce their ine¢ cien-
cies in order to keep their market position. Aghion et al. (2005) present a
theoretical basis enabling to encompass both arguments. The rationale con-
sists in considering that innovation is carried out by incumbents that take
into account not only post-innovations rents but the di¤erence between post-
and pre- innovation rents. The inclusion of positive and negative e¤ects of
competition leads to the inverted U-shape pattern depicting the relationship
between competition and innovation.
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One important prediction of Aghion et al. (2005) is that, for those rms
competing at the leading edge, it is the pro-innovation e¤ect of competition
that dominates. We show in this Section that the validity of this prediction
depends on the extent to which leaders are absents in the R&D contest.
Results are di¤erent if leaders do carry out R&D and, by doing so, they
can make more di¢ cult the catching-up process of laggards. For a sake of
presentation, we slightly modify the Aghion et al.s (2005) model to include
this possibility.
6.1 The baseline setup
Consider Aghion et al.s (2005) economy composed of a unit mass of identical
consumers. Each consumer supplies a unit of labour inelastically and has
a logarithmic instantaneous utility function u (yt) = ln yt with a constant
discount rate of r. The consumption good is produced with intermediate
goods according to the following production function:
ln yt =
Z 1
0
lnxjtdj (8)
In each industry j, there are two duopolists, A and B. At each date, the
nal consumption good needs, as inpunt, an aggregate good of each industry
with the form xj = xAj + xBj. Because of the utility functions specication
(8), each individual spends the same amount on each good. Total spending
is normalised to unity, so that the budget constraint is pAjxAj + pBjxBj = 1.
Each intermediate rm produces with constant returns to scale using
labour as the only input. Denoting k the technology level of the duopoly
rms in industry j, one unit of labour generates an output ow equal to:
Ai = 
ki i = A;B (9)
The baseline model assumes that, in any intermediate industry, the largest
gap between the leader and the follower is one technological step because of
knowledge externalities. If the leader innovate, the follower immediately
moves one step up the quality ladder so that the relative positions of the two
rms is not altered.
At any point in time, there will be two types of sectors in the economy:
leveled industries where both rms are at the same technological level and
unleveled industries where the technological leader is one quality step above
its competitor. Thus, three type of rms are possible i 2 f 1; 0; 1g : the
follower (i =  1); the rm in a level sector (i = 0), the leader rm (i = 1).
Depending on innovation rms A and B transit among these di¤erent states.
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Product market competition is modelled in the following way. The degree
of collusion  of the two rms in a leveled industry will measure the degree
of product market competition. Firms do not collude when the industry is
unleveled. In this case, the leader applies a limit pricing rule, setting a price
equal to the marginal cost of the laggard. The latter makes then zero prot
while the leader makes a prot equal to one minus its production cost (wages
are normalised to 1):
 1 = 0 1 = 1  1

(10)
In a leveled industry, if rms do not collude, Bertrand competion brings
prots to zero. At a maximum level of collusion, rms split the leader prots
between themselves (one half for each). Thus the model summarises in  =
1   (0    1=2) the degree of competition. Prots in leveled sectors are
then given by:
0 = (1 )1 (11)
If a rm moves one technological step ahead at a Poisson hazard rate
of n it incurs in a R&D cost c n
2
2
. The follower can move one step ahead
at a hazard rate h even without spending anything on R&D. One note n0
the R&D intensity of each rm in leveled industries, n 1 that of the follower
rm and n1 that of a leading rm in an unleveled industry. A particular
characteristic of the baseline model is that n1 = 0 since the leading rm has
no incentive to innovate because of the knowledge externality assumption. It
is this feature that we modify.
6.2 A leader reducing knowledge di¤usion
The assumption of a non-innovative technological leader appears to contra-
dict casual evidence in a large number of activities.5 We therefore slightly
modify the baseline setup exposed above to allow for leader innovation. We
keep the assumption restricting the maximum sustainable productivity gap
to be one step. As before, in an industry in which the leader has succeeded
in innovating, its rival will immediately be upgraded one step. However,
we consider that the leaders R&D e¤ort n1 makes it more di¢ cult for the
follower to innovate and move one step ahead, i.e. it reduces the catch-up
probability to h n1, with  a parameter capturing the ability of the leader
5One may for instance check the R&D expenditure of industry leaders given in Table
1 of Segerstrom (2007).
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to inuence the R&D di¢ culty of the follower. This type of e¤ect is sup-
ported by the empirical evidence provided by Crépon and Duguet (1997): in
narrow dened industries, they nd a negative externality of R&D between
competitors. One may suppose that the engagement of the leader in a new
discovery induces a change in the technological paradigm. Even if the quality
di¤erence is still one step, the leaders innovation makes this last step harder
to climb for the follower.6.
The steady state Bellman equations can be expressed as:
rV1 = 1 + (n 1 + h  n1) (V0   V1) + n1 (V1   V1)  cn
2
1
2
(12)
rV 1 =  1 + (n 1 + h  n1) (V0   V 1)  cn
2
 1
2
(13)
rV0 = 0 + n0 (V1   V0) + n0 (V 1   V0)  cn
2
0
2
(14)
Where Vi is the value of each type of rm i 2 f 1; 0; 1g. The R&D
e¤ort of the competitor in a leveled sector is denoted by n0: In a symmetric
Nash equilibrium both R&D intensity are equal. Hence, the baseline model of
Aghion et al. (2005) might be interpreted as a particular case in which  = 0.
Using the maximum principle, rst order conditions on the right-hand-side
lead to:
cn1 =  (V1   V0) (15)
cn 1 = V0   V 1 (16)
cn0 = V1   V0 (17)
Recalling that 0 = (1 )1 and solving for n1 and n 1 leads to the
reduced system:
0 = 1   cn1

+
cn21
2

1  1
2

(18)
6The very closely related quality ladder model of Grossman and Helpman [1991] also
assumes that leaders do not innovate. Rewards of a new improvement in quality are not
protable enough to incitate the leader to engage in R&D. Nevertheless, as pointed out in
Chapter 4, Footnote 4, leaders might have other reasons, namely to deter the innovation
of their rivals. This case is excluded in the standard quality ladder framework.
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0 =   (1 )1   1
2
cn21
2
+

+ n1

1

  

cn 1 +
cn2 1
2
(19)
Where   h + r. These equations give the solution for the leader R&D
e¤ort n1 and for that of the follower n 1, respectively. The following proposi-
tions analyse the properties of stationary R&D e¤orts in this jump-stochastic
process.
Proposition 1. The possibility of two stationary R&D e¤ort of the leader
rm depends on .
(a) For  < 1 there is one relevant stationary strategy for the leader:
n1a = 
c pD1
c
 
2   1 (20)
Where D1  2c2 2c
 
2   11: For this strategy, competition increases
R&D e¤ort.
(b) For  > 1 and 2  1 < 2c
21
there exists two relevant stationary strate-
gies for the leader: n1a and
n1b = 
c+
p
D1
c
 
2   1 (21)
For stratgey n1b, competition discourages R&D e¤ort.
Proof. This results relies on the possibility of one or two positive roots
of (18). First, we solve the quadratic equation (18). This gives n1a and n1b:
For  < 1 the coe¢ cient multiplying the squared term in (18) is negative:
c
2
 
1  1
2

< 0 . The discriminant D1 is positive when 
2   1 < 2c
21
; which
is allways ensured for  < 1. Hence the function rst increases and then
decreases (inverted U-shape). The intercept is positive (1), so only one
solution is positive. Clearly, for  < 1 the term
 
2   1 < 0 so that n1a
is the positive root in this case. One immediatley veries that for @n1a
@
<
0 (innovation-inducing e¤ect of competition): A similar reasoning applies
for  > 1. The coe¢ cient multiplying the squared term in (18) is now
positive: c
2
 
1  1
2

> 0. Since the intercept is positve, for 2 1 < 2c
21
D1 is
also positive and the curve depicted by (18) intercepts twice the n1 axis in the
positive side. These roots are given by n1a and n1b: For  > 1 one immediatley
veries that for @n1b
@
< 0 (innovation-deterring e¤ect of competition): 
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Proposition 2. The possibility of two stationary R&D e¤ort of a leveled
rm depends on .
(a) For  < 1 there is one relevant stationary strategy for a leveled rm:
n0a =
c pD1
c
 
2   1 (22)
Where D1  2c2 2c
 
2   11: For this strategy competition increases
R&D e¤ort.
(b) For  > 1 and 2 1 < 2c
21
there exists two relevant stationary strategies
for a leveled rm: n0a and
n0b =
c+
p
D1
c
 
2   1 (23)
For stratgey n0b competition discourages R&D e¤ort.
Proof. This result follows inmediately from Proposition 2 and the rst
order conditions (15) and (17) by which one deduces n1 = n0.
Proposition 2. For any value of ; competition discourages the stationary
R&D e¤ort of the follower rm. The followers stationary strategy is
given by:
n 1 =
    + n1  1    c+pD 1
c
(24)
Where D 1 
 
+ n1

1

   c2 + 2c h(1 )1 + 12 cn212 i.
Proof. This result comes from the solution of the quadratic equation
(19). The coe¢ cient multiplying the squared term in (19) is positive: c
2
> 0:
The discriminant D 1 is allways positive too. Thus, the polynomial function
rst decreases and then increases (U-shape). Since its intercept is negative
(  (1 )1  12 c(n1)
2
2
< 0) one solution lies on the negative side of the n 1
axis and the other on the positive one. Therefore, only the latter is relevant
and is given by (24).
The two possible stationary strategies of the leader will imply two type
of equilibrium since n0 and n 1 are functions of n1. As in Aghion et al.
(2005), the steady state equilibrium is dened in terms of the structure of
the sector. If 1 is the probability in steady state of being in an unleveled
sector, the probability that a sector moves from an unleveled state to a leveled
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one is then 1 (n 1 + h  n1). The transition in the opposite direction is
made with probability 20n0, where 0 denotes the steady-state probability of
being in a leveled sector. The steady state equilibrium is given by equalising
inward- and outward-ows:
1 (n 1 + h  n1) = 20n0 (25)
Where the condition 1 + 0 = 1; of course, must hold . This implies:
1 =
2n0
[(n 1 + h  n1) + 2n0] (26)
0 = 1  1 (27)
The R&D e¤ort of the leader does not change the structure of the in-
dustry, but it contributes to the aggregate ow of innovation, which can be
expressed as:
I = 1 (n 1 + h  n1 + n1) + 20n0 (28)
The implication of the stationary R&D e¤ort of the leader n1b is that the
the steady state proportion of unleveled sectors can be important, because
the leader innovates and the follower has a lower probability to catch-up.
In this type of sectors, if n1b applies, both leaders and followers R&D are
deterred by competition. Thus, the aggregate e¤ect of competition may be
in fact negative. This is what Figures 7 to 9 show. For the sake of brevity,
only numerical simulations are reported. The Figures display the aggregate
ow of innovation I as function of competition : Figure 7 considers the
stationary strategy n1a for  < 1 , which is the only possible outcome in this
case. With use a value of  very close to 0 ( = 0:001). As expected, for
very low values of ; the model reproduces the standards results: the e¤ects
of competition on innovation are given by an inverted U-shape pattern.
In Figure 8 we consider the stationary strategy n1a for  > 1. Since for
this case ( > 1) there is also a second stationary strategy, Figure 9 plots
aggregate innovation when the optimal R&D e¤ort of rms at the leading
edge is given by n1b: Hence, when the ability of the leader to reduce knowledge
di¤usion is important enough ( > 1) one has two possible equilibriums:
When the stationary strategy of the leader is given by n1a; the inverted U-
shape no longer holds and innovation appears as monotonically increasing
with competition. On the other hand, when the leader innovates at the
(numerically) higher rate n1b exactly the opposite occurs: competition is
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uniformly detrimental to innovation. As n1b > n1a one might interpret this
results as the outcome of erce rivalry in high technology industries.
Figure 7. The e¤ect of competition () on aggregate
ow of innovation (I) using n1a
h = 0:5; r = 0; c = 0:5; 1 = 0:8;  = 0:001
Figure 8. The e¤ect of competition () on aggregate
ow of innovation (I) using n1a
h = 0:5; r = 0; c = 0:5;1 = 0:8; = 1:01
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Figure 9. The e¤ect of competition () on
aggregate ow of innovation (I) using n1b
h = 0:5; r = 0; c = 0:5;1 = 0:8; = 1:01
Thus, this modication of the baseline model shows that the prediction
of a boosting e¤ect of competition on innovation in industries that are close
to the technological frontier is not the only possible equilibrium. Namely, if
leaders has enough inuences on laggards innovation the outcome of com-
petition may be detrimental for innovation.
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the proposition according to which the impact
of competition on innovative performance depends on the distance to the
technological frontier. Basically, this proposition states that competition
discourages innovation for laggard rms or industries but represents a ma-
jor incentive to innovate as the economy moves closer to the technological
frontier. This is consistent with the idea of an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between competition and innovation that is stepper for economies at the
leading edge of technology. To test the empirical validity of this proposition
we used a panel of industries for OECD countries.
The outcome of the estimations presented in this paper do not support
the existence of an innovation-bolstering e¤ect of product market competition
at the technological frontier. Concerning regulation, two main results arise
depending on specications and proxies. In the rst case, regulation has a
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positive e¤ect whatever the distance to the frontier and the magnitude of its
impact is higher the closer the industry is to the frontier. This is the case
when one considers the economy-wide indicators. In the second conguration,
which is representative of time-varying indicators of regulation, the e¤ect of
regulation is negative far from the frontier and vanishes or becomes positive
when the technology gap decreases. Based on these estimates, regulation, if
anything, might foster innovation at the leading edge. Regarding the measure
of the outcome of competition given by the relative number of rms, results
reveals that the positive e¤ect of competition is only observed for laggard
industries and is non-signicant at the top technological level.
These results, though contradicting the recent belief in the positive ef-
fects of competition on innovation, are compatible with previous theoretical
work and micro empirical studies that emphasised the existence of a Schum-
peterian e¤ect or even a size e¤ect in innovation. Similarly, results concerning
the positive impact of the public sector on innovation are also consistent with
arguments highlighting the suboptimality of the market equilibrium in the
presence of technological externalities. At the end, the lack of evidence sup-
porting the benets of market competition when industries come close to the
technology frontier raises important questions concerning economic policy.
Namely, strategies, such as those adopted in the Lisbon Agenda, strongly re-
lying on a positive e¤ect of product market deregulation on innovation seem
weakly supported by the data. Competition policy does not seem to be a
substitute for science and technology policy. A possible explanation of our
results, briey illustrated in the theoretical Section, put forward the active
presence of leaders in the innovative process.
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9 Appendix
Industry Country list
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco Austria
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear Belgium
17 Textiles Denmark
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur Finland
19 Leather, leather products and footwear France
20 Wood and products of wood and cork Germany
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing Greece
24 Chemicals and chemical products Ireland
25 Rubber and plastics products Italy
26 Other non-metallic mineral products Japan
27 Basic metals Netherland
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment Norway
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. Portugal
30 O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery Spain
31 Electrical machinery and aPPPratus, nec Sweden
32 Radio, television and communication equipment UK
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks US
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Table 8. List of industries and countries
Sample N mean Std. Dev. min max
OECD-STAN 4129 28,73 19,68 2,82 309,13
GGDC 6345 37,58 216,74 -12,21 12233,91
GGDC Industry 30 423 198,40 818,60 -12,21 12233,91
Final Filtered Data 6099 25,73 23,85 0,02 581,73
Table 9. Descriptive statistics of labour productivity in I-PPPs for di¤erent samples
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Country Mean I-PPPs CV I-PPPs Mean PPPs CV PPPs
Austria 23,19 0,80 25,98 0,60
Belgium 33,27 0,66 32,30 0,71
Denmark 23,44 0,55 23,60 0,46
Finland 26,87 0,73 25,86 0,76
France 28,01 0,99 29,79 0,88
Germany 28,61 0,74 28,19 0,85
Greece 12,24 0,66 13,51 0,68
Ireland 30,35 1,99 32,34 2,03
Italy 29,17 0,63 26,49 0,71
Japan 24,05 1,28 22,54 1,14
Netherland 31,84 0,63 32,86 0,44
Norway 25,42 0,49 26,64 0,45
Portugal 14,03 0,79 15,86 0,70
Spain 25,77 0,49 24,25 0,52
Sweden 27,98 0,58 26,88 0,52
UK 22,74 0,68 25,44 0,62
US 30,86 0,60 30,86 0,60
Total 25,73 0,93 26,07 0,91
Table 10. Mean values and coe¢ cient of variation of Labour Productivity by country
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Industry Mean I-PPPs CV I-PPPs Mean PPPs CV PPPs
Basic metals 29,21 0,39 28,36 0,38
Chemicals and ch 54,73 0,94 45,16 0,78
Electrical machi 22,93 0,47 25,00 0,45
Fabricated metal 20,53 0,42 19,50 0,36
Food products, b 24,20 0,44 25,41 0,37
Machinery and eq 23,02 0,36 23,57 0,32
Medical, precisi 19,97 0,50 24,08 0,46
Motor vehicles, 18,92 0,70 26,81 0,47
O¢ ce, accounti 29,69 1,49 27,68 1,41
Other non-metall 30,97 0,36 25,28 0,34
Pulp, paper, pap 26,80 0,35 28,27 0,34
Radio, televisio 26,20 1,78 35,74 1,90
Rubber and plast 32,02 0,44 23,26 0,35
Textiles, textil 12,89 0,39 15,64 0,35
Wood and product 16,25 0,43 18,25 0,37
Total 25,73 0,93 26,07 0,91
Table 11. Mean values and coe¢ cient of variation of Labour Productivity by industry
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Labor productivity 6099 25,73 23,85 0,02 581,73
Closeness to the frontier (%) 6099 56,89 24,07 1,93 100
Patents over hour worked 6345 0,00165 0,00939 0,00000 0,39679
Capital intensity 2785 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,20
REGREF 6375 4,19 1,31 1,05 6,00
REGIMP 6375 0,13 0,04 0,05 0,22
PMR 5760 1,80 0,44 0,92 2,78
PMR (Public) 6375 3,01 1,28 0,00 4,61
N-FIRMS/VA 2599 2,06 3,67 0,00 37,70
Table 12. Global descriptive statistics
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Variable Model 2 p-value
pit AR(1) 770.384 0.000
pit AR(1)+trend 451.852 0.970
pit AR(1)+drift 1810.240 0.000
clit AR(1) 897.568 0.000
clit AR(1)+trend 811.743 0.000
clit AR(1)+drift 1809.637 0.000
klit AR(1) 268.474 0.855
klit AR(1)+trend 320.743 0.136
klit AR(1)+drift 608.019 0.000
exit AR(1) 565.012 0.046
exit AR(1)+trend 217.560 1.000
exit AR(1)+drift 1615.682 0.000
pit AR(2) 615.627 0.001
pit AR(2)+trend 284.219 1.000
pit AR(2)+drift 1593.648 0.000
clit AR(2) 542.291 0.083
clit AR(2)+trend 433.096 0.984
clit AR(2)+drift 1334.333 0.000
klit AR(2) 255.967 0.947
klit AR(2)+trend 640.608 0.000
klit AR(2)+drift 526.042 0.000
exit AR(2) 311.474 1.000
exit AR(2)+trend 188.493 1.000
exit AR(2)+drift 1244.758 0.000
Table 13. Unit Root Test Maddala and Wu (1999) (Ho: Non Stationary)
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